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     * Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, Senior United States District Judge for the District of
New Jersey, sitting by designation.
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                                                                                     NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 05-4448
            
AY SIOE OEI; YUKI KODAMA,
                 Petitioners,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                  Respondent.
          
On Appeal from the Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
dated September 2, 2005
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 8, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL, Circuit Judges, and IRENAS,* Senior District Judge.
(Filed: January 22, 2007)
         
OPINION
         
     1 Because the Board issued a single-member decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1,
this Court will review the decision of the Board and the Immigration Judge.  See Board of
Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg.
54878, 54886 (August 26, 2002) (“the parties and any reviewing court would be able to
look to the combination of the Immigration Judge’s opinion and the single-member
decision to understand the conclusions reached in the adjudication.”) Chen v. BIA, 435
F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2006); Abebe v. Gonzoles, 432 F.3d 1037, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2005).
     2 Under the “substantial evidence” standard of review, the ruling of the Board of
Immigration Appeals must be upheld unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 n.1 (1992) (to reverse the Board, the evidence must not merely
support reversal, but compel reversal).
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IRENAS, Senior United States District Judge.
Petitioners Ay Sioe Oei and Yuki Kodama seek review of a final order issued by
the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”) affirming the decision of the
Immigration Judge denying their applications for asylum and withholding of removal.1 
This Court must determine whether the decisions of the Immigration Judge and the Board
of Immigration Appeals denying petitioners’ applications were supported by substantial
evidence in the record.2
I.
The Petitioners, Oei and Kodama, are mother and daughter.  (Pet. Br. at 4).  Ms.
Oei, a 37-year old female, is a native and citizen of Indonesia and was admitted to the
United States on May 9, 2001, as a non-immigrant with authorization to remain for a six
month period, which expired on November 8, 2001.  (Res. Br. at 3).  Kodama, her minor
daughter, is a native of Indonesia and citizen of Japan, who was admitted to the United
     3  Petitioner does not advance the argument that the Convention Against Torture
requires the stay of the removal order against her.  The record also does not contain any
evidence of torture.
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States on July 11, 2000 as a non-immigrant with authorization to remain until January 10,
2001.  (Id.)
On August 21, 2002, Oei filed a Form I-558, “Application for Asylum and for
Withholding of Removal,” with the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (the
“INS”).  (Id.)  On October 16, 2002, the INS commenced removal proceedings against
Petitioners by issuing to both petitioners a Form I-862, “Notice to Appear,” charging
them with being removable under Section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration Naturalization
Act (the “INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), as aliens who remained in the Unites States
for a time longer than permitted.  (Id.).
On May 17, 2004, after an evidentiary hearing, an Immigration Judge denied
Petitioners’ application for asylum and for withholding of removal and protection under
the Convention Against Torture,3 and ordered them removed from the United States to
Indonesia.  (Id. at 4).  On September 2, 2005, the Board affirmed the decision of the
Immigration Judge.  (Id.).
Petitioners’ case for asylum focuses on alleged persecution Ms. Oei claims to have
suffered because she is ethnically Chinese, and because she is a Catholic in
predominantly Islamic Indonesia.  (Pet. Br. at 5).  Ms. Oei claims that if returned to
Indonesia, she and her daughter would suffer further discrimination and persecution,
4creating an unsafe environment for her daughter to grow into adulthood.  (Id.).
With regard to the alleged persecution based on her ethnicity, Ms. Oei claims that
native Indonesians threw stones at Chinese people’s stores in her neighborhood, to which
the police did not respond or assist.  (Pet. Br. at 5).  In another instance, Ms. Oei testified
that as she was passing a soccer stadium on her motorcycle, some teenagers bumped into
the rear of her cycle causing her to fall off and hurt her leg.  (Id.).  She claims that she
was burned by the motorcycle’s exhaust pipe, and that the teenagers then ran over her
foot, laughing and yelling obscenities.  (Id.).  Ms. Oei’s affidavit states that she was
hospitalized for two weeks, but her testimony states that she was hospitalized for two to
three weeks.  When asked to resolve the discrepancy between her affidavit and testimony,
she stated that she was hospitalized for two weeks and treated as an outpatient for one
week.  (Res. Br. at 11).  Ms. Oei also claims that the police witnessed the incident but
refused to assist her.  (Pet Br. at 6).  In another alleged instance of persecution because of
her ethnicity, Ms. Oei claims that she was fondled and harassed by a group of young men
near a graveyard while she was walking home from school.  (Id.).
With respect to persecution based on her religion, Ms. Oei states that such
persecution “was not as severe as other incidents.”  (Id. at 7).  She recounts one alleged
occasion in 1986; when she was attending mass, stones were thrown at the church,
breaking some of the church’s artwork.  (Id.).  Ms. Oei also testified about another
incident that occurred while she was using public transportation, where other passengers
asked Ms. Oei what her religion is.  She testified that upon answering that she is Catholic,
     4  Ms. Oei also argues that the Board and the Immigration Judge erred by not crediting her
claims.  This argument is moot because we assume that her claims are true in this opinion.
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the other passengers became negative and asked “why did you join Catholicism” and
urged her to join Islam.  (Id.).
The Immigration Judge found that Ms. Oei’s testimony was not credible because
of several discrepancies and inconsistencies between her testimony and asylum
application.  (Id. at 12).  The Judge also found that even assuming Ms. Oei’s testimony
were credible, she would not have proven that she had been “persecuted” either for her
ethnicity or religion to the extent that would warrant the granting of asylum or
withholding of removal.  (Id. at 14).  The Board, affirmed the Immigration Judge’s
decision.  (Id. at 17).
II.
This Court has appellate jurisdiction to review any final order of removal under 8
U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1), 1252(b).  See also Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 234-46 (3d Cir.
2003) (en banc); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 548-49 (3d Cir. 2001).
III.
The issue before this Court is whether Ms. Oei established a “well-founded fear”
of persecution in Indonesia, assuming the hostilities she experienced in Indonesia were
true.4
6Section 208(b)(1) of the INA grants the Attorney General the discretion to grant
asylum to “refugees.”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 428 n.5 (1987).  An alien who seeks asylum must establish that she is a “refugee” as
defined by the INA.  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 482 (3d Cir. 2001).  A refugee is
defined by the INA as a person who is unable or unwilling to return to his country of
nationality “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 
Id.
Section 243 of the INA governs withholding of removal of an illegal alien.  8
U.S.C. § 1252.  In order to be eligible for a withholding of removal, an alien must show
that there is clear probability that she would be subject to persecution on account of one
or more of five statutory grounds.  INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 423 (1984); 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(b).  If the petitioner establishes that he or she has experienced a past threat to
such life or liberty interests, a rebuttable presumption exists that there is a clear
probability of future prosecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1).  The presumption may be
rebutted if the Immigration Judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (A)
there has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant’s life or
freedom would not be threatened on account of the statutory grounds after the applicant’s
removal to that country; or (B) the applicant could avoid a future threat to his or her life
or freedom by relocating to another part of the proposed country of removal and it would
be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so under the totality of the circumstances.  8
7C.F.R. §§ 208.16(b)(1)(i)(A) and (B).
In cases in which the applicant has established past persecution, the INS bears the
burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the requirements of
§ (b)(1)(i)(A) or (B).  If the applicant’s fear of future threat to life or freedom is unrelated
to the past persecution, the applicant bears the burden to establish that she would suffer
such harm.  Id.
The “clear probability of persecution” burden of proof required to establish
withholding of removal is more stringent than the “well-founded fear” standard of proof
required for asylum.  Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 441.  Withholding of removal
requires that an applicant satisfy two burdens: (1) that she is a refugee, i.e., she has at
least a “well-founded fear of persecution”; and (2) that the refugee show that his or her
life or freedom would be threatened if deported.  Thus, if an alien does not meet the
eligibility standard for asylum, he or she will necessarily be unable to meet the standard
for withholding of removal.  Id;  Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).
To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must show that he or she has a “well-
founded fear of future persecution.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421, 438-39.  This
test has been described as having both an objective and subjective component.  To satisfy
the subjective component, the petitioner must demonstrate a subjective fear of persecution
through credible testimony that her fear is genuine.  Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d at 469. 
To satisfy the objective component, the petitioner’s fear must be of the degree which
would be experienced by a “reasonable person in the same circumstances.”  Id.  This may
8be accomplished either by showing that the petitioner would be individually singled out
for persecution, or by demonstrating that “there is a pattern or practice in his or her
country of nationality ... of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the
applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion...”  Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A).
The “well founded fear of future prosecution” standard does not require proof that
persecution is “more likely than not” if an alien is deported.  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. at 438. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit has held that “persecution is an extreme
concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” 
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993).  It extends only to grave harms such as
threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they
constitute a threat to life or freedom.  Id. at 1240. 
Past persecution requires proof of (1) one or more incidents rising to the level of
persecution; (2) that is ‘on account of’ one of the statutorily-protected grounds; and (3) is
committed either by the government or by forces that the government is either unable or
unwilling to control.  In the absence of evidence of an intent to persecute on account of a
protected ground, it was not unreasonable for the Immigration Judge to conclude that an
incident did not constitute past persecution. Silvana v. AG of the United States, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29222 at *4 (3d Cir. 2006).  Random, isolated acts perpetrated by
anonymous thieves do not establish persecution. Id. 
Under these standards, even assuming Ms. Oei’s account of her experience were
9found to be credible, the harassment and unlawful conduct that she was subjected to does
not rise to the level of persecution under the INA.  With regard to the two alleged
incidents involving Ms. Oei’s religion, the stoning of her church two decades ago and the
verbal confrontation she experienced while riding on public transportation do not amount
to “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they
constitute a threat to life or freedom.”  Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.  As the Immigration Judge
observed, no one was injured when stones were thrown at Ms. Oei’s church, and the
stoning was an isolated incident.  (Res. Br. at 15).  In addition, the encounter on public
transportation, in which other riders asked her about her religion and expressed some
disapproval, clearly does not rise to the level of “persecution” described above.  See
Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.
Ms. Oei testified to incidents, including unwanted touching and sexual advances,
as well as an assault and resulting hospitalization.  However, none of these unfortunate
events have been linked to any evidence in the record indicating that they were
perpetrated because of Ms. Oei’s Chinese ethnicity.  Such random isolated acts by
anonymous perpetrators do not amount to persecution under the INA.  Gormley v.
Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530,
537-38 (3d Cir. 2005).
Ms. Oei also argues that anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia has led to severe,
widespread violence against Chinese owned businesses, and against Chinese women and
girls.  (Pet. Br. at 13).  However, the this Court observed in Lie, 396 F.3d at 537, a case
10
with similar facts to this one, that such violence was not sufficiently widespread to
constitute a pattern or practice of violence.  Moreover, this Court noted in Lie that there
appears to have been a sharp decline in violence against Chinese Christians following the
height of the violence in 1998.  Id.; see 1999 Country Report on Indonesia; see also Pui v.
AG of the United States, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28871 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting the
argument that the violence against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia amounted to a “pattern or
practice”).
Ms. Oei’s account of her experiences in Indonesia did not satisfy the standard for
asylum.  Because the burden of proof required for withholding of removal is more
stringent that the burden of proof for asylum, she necessarily fails to meet the standard for
withholding of removal.  Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d at 182.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, the petition for review will be Denied. 
